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NATIVE AMERICANS – SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:  
DETERMINING WHETHER THE INDIAN GAMING 
REGULATORY ACT ABROGATES TRIBAL SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY FOR LAWSUITS ARISING OUTSIDE OF INDIAN 
COUNTRY 




In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) did 
not implicitly or explicitly abrogate the common law doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity so as to allow a state to file a federal suit against an 
Indian tribe for illegal gambling activity taking place outside of Indian 
country.  The Court reasoned that neither the text nor the legislative history 
of IGRA indicated a desire on the part of Congress to abrogate tribal 
immunity to allow for such suits; the fact that IGRA specifically addresses 
activities occurring inside of Indian country was dispositive to the Court 
that Congress chose to leave traditional state-law remedies in place when 
illegal gaming activity occurs outside of Indian country.  The Court was 
also unwilling to overrule its previous decision of Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., which expanded the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to cover suits arising from contracting 
disputes with non-Indian businesses off-reservation.  The Court’s holding in 
Bay Mills clarifies the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity within the 
controversial context of Indian gaming.  However, this will not result in any 
expansion of Indian gaming beyond Indian country.  On the contrary, the 
Court’s decision makes clear that states will continue to have a number of 
remedies available to them to prevent Indian gaming off-reservation, just 
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I. FACTS 
The Bay Mills Indian Community (“Bay Mills”) is a federally 
recognized Indian tribe located in Northern Michigan.1  In 1993, it entered 
into a gaming compact with the State of Michigan (“Michigan”) to open up 
a Class III gaming facility on its reservation,2 which would include  
casino-style gambling, such as electronic gaming terminals and table 
games.3  A provision of the compact expressly stated that neither Michigan 
nor Bay Mills had waived their sovereign immunity from suit,4 as the 
 
1.  Brief for Respondent at 9, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014) 
(No. 12-515) (“The Bay Mills Indian Community has lived in what is now the State of Michigan 
for centuries.  Continuously acknowledged since the earliest European contacts with the area, Bay 
Mills has been federally recognized in its current form since 1936.  The tribe has approximately 
2,000 registered members, the majority of whom reside on or near the Bay Mills Reservation in 
Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.”).  
2.  Id.  at 11-13. 
3.  Id.  at 12.  
4.  Id. 
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compact set out its own dispute resolution procedures to govern any 
disagreements.5  Pursuant to the compact, Bay Mills drafted its own gaming 
ordinance, which the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) 
subsequently approved.6  The Bay Mills Gaming Commission (“Gaming 
Commission”) was established thereafter to administer the Tribe’s gaming 
ordinance according to the terms of the compact.7 
In 2010, Bay Mills purchased property in the town of Vanderbilt, 
Michigan with proceeds it had earned from a land settlement with the 
federal government.8  Bay Mills sought to open another Class III gaming 
facility on the Vanderbilt property (“the Vanderbilt Casino”).  The Gaming 
Commission issued a license to authorize the opening of the Vanderbilt 
Casino.  Michigan subsequently sued Bay Mills in federal district court 
under IGRA,9 seeking a preliminary injunction against the opening of the 
Vanderbilt Casino.10  It claimed that the opening of the Vanderbilt Casino 
violated the terms of the Tribal-State gaming compact and thus constituted 
illegal gambling activity under IGRA.11  In its defense, Bay Mills cited the 
language of the MILCSA12 and claimed that since the Vanderbilt property 
had been purchased with monies from its Land Trust, it ought to be 
considered “Indian lands” per the language of IGRA.13  However, the 
Department of the Interior issued a memorandum declaring that the 
 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id.  Bay Mills was part of the Michigan Land Claims Settlement Act of 1997 
(“MLCSA”), 111 Stat. 2652, which consolidated the land claims of several federally recognized 
tribes including the Sault St. Marie Chippewa Tribe and the Little Traverse Bay Tribe.  111 Stat. 
2658.  The MLCSA provided that a certain percentage of Bay Mills’ settlement was to be paid 
into a “Land Trust,” the proceeds of which would be used to purchase and improve property for 
the Tribe.  Id.  The text of the MLCSA stated that “[a]ny land acquired with funds from the Land 
Trust shall be held as Indian lands are held.”  Id.  Bay Mills purchased the Vanderbilt property 
with interest generated from the Land Trust.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 12. 
9.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2029 (2014).  Michigan sued Bay 
Mills pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which reads in relevant part:  “The United States 
district courts shall have jurisdiction over—(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian 
tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any 
Tribal-State compact entered into . . . that is in effect . . . .”  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2006). 
10.  Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2029. 
11.  Brief for Petitioner at 13, Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014) (No. 12-515) (“On 
December 16, 2010, Michigan’s Attorney General sent a letter to Bay Mills ordering it to 
immediately close the Vanderbilt casino because it violated state and federal gaming laws.  Bay 
Mills refused, so the State filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin any further operation of the 
casino.”). 
12.  See discussion supra note 8. 
13.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
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Vanderbilt property could not be considered Indian country.14  As a result, 
the district court granted Michigan’s motion for a preliminary injunction.15  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered the injunction be 
dissolved, holding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity barred 
Michigan’s suit.16  Michigan appealed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether the IGRA abrogated tribal sovereign 
immunity to the extent that Michigan was alleging. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Within the framework of American constitutional law, Native 
American tribes occupy a unique position.17  They are considered to be 
“domestic dependent nations,”18 political units that retain their inherent 
sovereignty but are nonetheless subject to certain limitations on the exercise 
of such sovereignty.  The exact boundaries of tribal sovereignty have 
expanded and contracted throughout history as a result of complex, 
overlapping factors, including treaties, federal legislation, executive orders, 
and judicial interpretations thereof.19  It is foundational principle of federal 
Indian law that Native American tribes are subject to the plenary power of 
Congress.20  This essentially means that Congress has the final word as to 
the scope of tribal sovereignty and the powers that Tribes are able to 
exercise.21  One exception to this general rule is the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity.  Tribal sovereign immunity is part of federal common 
 
14.  Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, joint app. at 83, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2029 (2014) (No. 12-515) (“Even if the Tribe had used its Land Trust 
earnings to purchase land in an area that could be said to consolidate and enhance tribal 
landholdings, I do not believe that the MILCSA would operate as a matter of law to transform that 
land purchase into Indian lands under IGRA.”) (emphasis in original). 
15.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The district 
court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop gaming (a euphemism often 
unavoidable for our purposes here) at the Vanderbilt casino.”). 
16.  Id.  at 416-17. 
17.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831) (“The condition of the Indians, in 
relation to the United States, is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.”). 
18.  Id.  at 17. 
19.  See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians § 7 (2014). 
20.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress 
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently 
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”). 
21.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes . . . incorporation 
within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested 
them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously exercised.  By specific treaty 
provision they yielded up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its plenary control, 
Congress has removed still others.”) (citation omitted). 
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law; it was not created by any statute or act of Congress.22  Rather, the 
Supreme Court first identified it, and its exact boundaries have been further 
defined through a substantial body of federal case law.23 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged tribal sovereign immunity in 
Turner v. United States,24 in which a non-Indian lessee was barred from 
suing an Indian tribe for alleged damage done to his property.25  The Court 
stated that it is the “general law” that “[l]ike other governments, municipal 
as well as state, [tribes are] free from liability for injuries to persons or 
property . . . .”26  In United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co.,27 the Supreme Court reiterated that Indian tribes are immune from suit 
when it voided a monetary judgment from a previous proceeding against the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.28  It stated that tribes do not waive their 
 
22.  See Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity:  A Primer, 50 THE ADVOC. 19, 19 (2007). 
23.  Id. 
24.  28 U.S. 354 (1919). 
25.  Id.  at 357.  The dispute in Turner concerned the efforts of a non-Indian rancher (Turner) 
to secure grazing land from members of the Creek Nation (now more commonly known as the 
Muscogee Nation).  Id.  at 355.  Turner leased approximately 256,000 acres from approximately 
one hundred Creek Indians.  Id.  at 355-56.  Turner secured, by judicial order, the right to build a 
fence around the leased land and undertook construction of such a fence.  Id.  However, a mob of 
Creek Indians destroyed the fence, causing damage to the tune of $10,000.  Id.  Turner sued the 
Creek Nation and the federal government in its trustee capacity.  Id. at 357.  In an opinion 
authored by Justice Brandeis, the Court held that “[w]ithout authorization from Congress, the 
[Creek] Nation could not then have been sued in any court; at least without its consent.”  Id.  at 
358. 
26.  Id.  at 357-58. 
27.  309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
28.  Id. at 513.  United States Fidelity involved a complex dispute over coal leasing royalties.  
The federal government leased land held in trust for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (“the 
Tribes”) to a coal mining company, with a bond in place securing royalty payments for the Tribes.  
Id. at 510.  The United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (“US Fidelity”) served as a surety to the 
royalty bond.  Id.  The coal lease would be assigned several times, with US Fidelity remaining as 
the surety on record.  Id.  Ultimately, the lease was assigned to the Central Coal & Coke Company 
(“Central Coal”), which eventually went into receivership.  Id.  As part of Central Coal’s 
bankruptcy proceedings, the United States filed a claim on behalf of the Tribes for unpaid 
royalties.  Id.  In a separate action, the United States filed a claim against US Fidelity for the same 
royalties at issue in the Central Coal dispute.  Id.  Central Coal cross-claimed for credits 
apparently owed to it by the Tribe.  Id.  The federal district court administering the bankruptcy 
awarded a judgment against the Tribes in favor of Central Coal.  Id.  This judgment occurred 
while the dispute against US Fidelity was still ongoing.  Id.  In light of the judgment against the 
Tribes, US Fidelity claimed that the United States was estopped from asserting its claims under 
the doctrine of res judicata.  Id. at 511.  The Supreme Court held that Central Coal’s cross-claim 
should have been barred by the Tribes’ immunity from suit; thus, the monetary judgment against 
the Tribes was void and the United States’ suit against US Fidelity was allowed to proceed.  Id. at 
512.   
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sovereign immunity when they fail to object to cross-claims in litigation.29  
In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of Washington,30 the 
Court held that a state could not sue a tribe to enforce its fishing regulations 
in Indian country “[a]bsent an effective waiver or consent” from either the 
Tribe or the United States.31  However, the Court refused to extend this 
immunity to individual officials or representatives of the Tribe.32 
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,33 the Court expanded Puyallup’s 
holding by stating that any waiver of tribal immunity “‘must be 
unequivocally expressed.’”34  In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,35 the Court rejected a contention that was 
nearly identical to the one it had addressed in United States Fidelity over a 
half-century prior, further solidifying the status of tribal immunity as black 
letter law.36  In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 
Inc.,37 the Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that Native American 
tribes were immune from suit for activities engaged in outside of Indian 
country.  Specifically, the Court declared:  “Tribes enjoy immunity from 
suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or 
commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a 
 
29.  Id. at 512-13 (“These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional 
authorization.  It is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the United 
States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.  Possessing this immunity from direct suit, we 
are of the opinion it possesses a similar immunity from cross-suits.”). 
30.  433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
31.  Id.  at 172. 
32.  Id.  at 173 (“[T]he successful assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in this case does not 
impair the authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual defendants over 
whom it properly obtained personal jurisdiction.”). 
33.  436 U.S. 49 (1978).  Santa Clara Pueblo concerned the applicability of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA).  Even though ICRA was meant to provide substantive individual rights to 
Indians within Indian country (where the Constitution is largely inapplicable), the Supreme Court 
nonetheless held that tribes were immune from suit under the ICRA, even when sued by their own 
members.  Id.  at 58. 
34.  Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). 
35.  498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
36.  Id. at 509.  Potawatomi concerned the untaxed sale of cigarettes in Indian country to 
non-Indians and non-member Indians.  The Potawatomi Tribe sold cigarettes without state tax 
stamps not only to members of the Tribe (which was perfectly legal), but also to non-Indians.  Id.  
at 507.  Oklahoma claimed it had the right to tax any sales made to non-Indians, including those 
that took place on the Potawatomi’s reservation.  Id.  The Tribe sued Oklahoma for injunctive 
relief, and Oklahoma cross-claimed for the alleged outstanding cigarette taxes.  Id.  at 507-08.  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Potawatomi because the United States Fidelity decision 
was issued prior to the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id.  at 509-10.  However, 
the Court held that even though counter-claims are “mandatory” under Rule 13(a), Oklahoma’s 
claim against the Tribe was nonetheless barred.  Id.  at 510.  
37.  523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
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reservation.”38  The Court did express some hesitation in reaching this 
decision, stating that “[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of 
perpetuating the doctrine [of tribal immunity].”39  “[T]ribal immunity 
extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance,” the 
Court stated, and this “consideration[] might suggest a need to abrogate 
tribal immunity . . . .”40  However, because Congress had not specifically 
abrogated tribal immunity in the context of the case, the Court “decline[d] 
to revisit [its] case law and [chose] to defer to Congress.”41 
B. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
Congress developed IGRA to remedy a regulatory gap in Indian 
country.42  The Supreme Court has often been the forum by which these 
regulatory gaps in Indian country have been identified.  Take, for example, 
the seminal federal Indian law case of Ex Parte Crow Dog.43  In 1883, the 
Supreme Court declared that the federal government had no criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes that occurred between Indians in Indian country.44  
Two years later, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act,45 which 
empowered the federal government to assert exactly the sort of criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country that Ex Parte Crow Dog denied.46  Similarly, 
in the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia,47 the Supreme Court held 
that the states could not have criminal or regulatory authority inside Indian 
country.48  That is, until Congress passed Public Law 280 in 1953, which 
automatically granted six states unlimited criminal jurisdiction inside Indian 
 
38.  Id.  at 760. 
39.  Id.  at 758. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id.  at 760. 
42.  25 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (1988) (“The Congress finds that . . . existing Federal law does not 
provide clear standards or regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands . . . .”). 
43.  109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
44.  Id.  at 572 (“the first district court of Dakota was without jurisdiction to find or try the 
indictment against the prisoner; that the conviction and sentence are void, and that his 
imprisonment is illegal.”). 
45.  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885). 
46.  The Major Crimes Act, in its original form, granted the federal government jurisdiction 
over “seven major crimes” if they were committed by an Indian, against another Indian, and the 
locus of the crime was within Indian country.  These crimes were murder, manslaughter, burglary, 
rape, larceny, arson, and assault with intent to commit murder.  Since 1885, the Major Crimes Act 
has been amended a number of times to add new crimes over which the federal government will 
have jurisdiction, including incest, kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor.  Id. 
47.  31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
48.  Id.  at 520 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force . . . .”). 
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country and gave remaining states the option to assume criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country if they so wished.49 
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided the case of California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians,50 which concerned both the lawfulness of 
gambling within Indian country and Public Law 280.  The Cabazon Band 
owned a bingo hall and a card club on its reservation in Northern 
California.51  Non-Indians from surrounding communities were the primary 
customers of the bingo hall and card club.52  California was (and continues 
to be) a Public Law 280 state, and California attempted to enforce its 
gaming regulations over the Band’s bingo hall under color of its criminal 
jurisdiction, which would have forced the hall to become a charitable,  
non-profit operation.53  Riverside County also attempted to enforce its 
gaming regulations on the Band’s reservation, which would have resulted in 
the closure of the card club.54  The Band sued both California and Riverside 
County in federal district court, claiming that neither entity had any 
authority to enforce their gaming laws inside Indian country.55  The district 
court granted the Band’s motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.56 
At the Supreme Court, California argued that Public Law 280 
abrogated tribal sovereignty to the extent that it was entitled to enforce its 
gaming regulations over the Band.57  The Court disagreed.  It held that in 
the absence of any clear authorization from either Congress or the Tribes, 
states and municipalities could not impose and enforce their own laws in 
Indian country.58  Public Law 280, the Court reasoned, was passed by 
Congress to remedy the problem of lawlessness in Indian country.59  The 
gaming regulations at issue were not criminal or prohibitive in nature, but 
rather were civil and regulatory.  Therefore, California had no basis to 
assert juris diction.60 
 
49.  28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1953).  The six mandatory states are Alaska, Nebraska, California, 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  Id.  
50.  480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
51.  Id.  at 204-05. 
52.  Id.  at 205. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id.  at 205-06. 
55.  Id.  at 206. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id.  at 207. 
58.  Id.  at 221-22. 
59.  Id.  at 208. 
60.  Id.  at 212. 
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In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed IGRA in 1988.61  
IGRA provides a complex and detailed framework for the regulation of 
gambling and gaming activities within Indian country.  It led to the 
establishment of the National Indian Gaming Committee (“NIGC”), the 
agency mandated by the IGRA to administer its provisions.62  The IGRA 
divided gaming activities into three different classes.  “Class I gaming” is 
defined as “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional 
forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in 
connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.”63  Class I gaming is 
subject only to the regulatory authority of the Tribe and does not fall within 
the tenets of the IGRA.64  “Class II gaming” includes bingo and other 
games similar to bingo, such as pull-tabs.65  Class II gaming also includes 
card games not prohibited by state law.66  Tribes generally retain exclusive 
regulatory power over Class II gaming activities, subject to certain 
qualifications.67  First, the gaming activity in question must be approved by 
the NIGC.68  Second, if a card game is not prohibited by state law, but is 
nonetheless regulated, the Tribe must conform to the applicable state 
regulations if it wishes to offer such a card game.69 
“Class III gaming” includes all other forms of gaming not covered by 
Class I or II.70  This includes most forms of casino-style gaming, including:  
(a) multiplayer table and card games, such as roulette, blackjack, poker, and 
craps; (b) video lottery terminals and slot machines; and (c) virtual betting 
or wagering on real-time events, such as sports.71  Unsurprisingly, Class III 
gaming is the most heavily regulated under IGRA.  In order for a Tribe to 
 
61.  25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2014). 
62.  25 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2014). 
63.  25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2014). 
64.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2014). 
65.  25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(I)-(III) (2014). 
66.  25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I)-(II).  Note that if a particular game is prohibited under 
state law, a Tribe cannot offer such a game within its territory.  Similarly, if a state prohibits 
gambling altogether, a Tribe is completely barred from offering either Class II or Class III gaming 
activities.  For example, Utah has a blanket prohibition on gambling, so tribes like the Utah 
Navajo Nation cannot enjoy the benefits of gaming or the protections of the IGRA.  See Randy 
Harward, Navajo Bingo No-Go, SALT LAKE CITY WEEKLY, April 14, 2010, 
http://www.cityweekly net/utah/navajo-bingo-no-go/Content?oid=2144973. 
67.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2014). 
68.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B) (2014). 
69.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(4)(A) (2014). 
70.  25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2014). 
71.  Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Jurisdictional Issues Arising Under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act 197 A.L.R. FED. 459 (2004) (“Class III gaming is defined as all forms of 
gaming that are not Class I gaming or Class II gaming including slot machines, casino games, 
banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries . . . .”). 
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engage in Class III gaming on its lands, a tribe must satisfy several statutory 
prerequisites.  First, the particular form of gaming sought by the Tribe 
cannot be prohibited under state law.72  Second, the Tribe must negotiate a 
compact with the State, and the Secretary of the Interior must approve this 
compact.73  Third, the Tribe must have in place a Tribal gaming ordinance 
that has been approved by the NIGC.74 
In 1996, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a section 
of IGRA in the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.75  In that case, 
the Seminole Tribe sued Florida under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)76 of IGRA 
for failure to negotiate a gaming compact with the Tribe in good faith.77  
Florida claimed that section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) was unconstitutional because 
it purported to waive the sovereign immunity of the States without their 
explicit consent.78  The Court agreed with Florida, holding that regardless 
of the fact that the Indian Commerce Clause79 authorized Congress to pass 
the IGRA, “notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent to abrogate the States’ 
sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress 
that power . . . .”80  Therefore, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits 
Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal 
court.”81  As a result of this decision, very little bargaining power remained 
with tribes, which negatively affected the tribes’ ability to negotiate 
favorable gaming compacts.82 
 
72.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A) (2014). 
73.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2014). 
74.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2014). 
75.  517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
76.  This section of the IGRA reads: 
[t]he United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over . . . any cause of action 
initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations 
with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact . . . or to 
conduct such negotiations in good faith . . . . 
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2014). 
77.  Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 52.  
78.  Id. 
79.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
80.  Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 47. 
81.  Id.  at 76. 
82.  See Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from States in Gaming 
Compacts to Further Tribal Economic Development:  Satisfying the “Economic Benefits” Test, 54 
S.D. L. REV. 419, 432 (2009) (“The Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe left IGRA at the very least 
crippled, but at the most, completely broken (at least from the tribal prospective).  Tribes were left 
with virtually no negotiating power.  After Seminole Tribe, it was approximately two years before 
another class III gaming compact was finalized. States simply refuse to negotiate if they do not 
want a tribe to conduct class III gaming without sharing revenue or for any other reason.”) 
(explanatory parenthetical appearing in original). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the majority.83  It held that 
IGRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity to allow for federal suits 
when the locus of the alleged illegal gaming activity is not in Indian 
country.84  First, the Court interpreted several provisions of IGRA before 
ultimately concluding that the plain language of the statute only enables 
states to sue tribes in federal court when the locus of the illegal “gaming 
activity” is “on Indian lands,” that is, when the actual gambling is taking 
place within Indian country.85  The Court refused to rewrite IGRA to create 
Michigan’s desired remedy, particularly in light of the numerous remedies 
states can exercise over Indian commercial activities on state lands.86  Next, 
the Court addressed Michigan’s request to overrule Kiowa.  The Court held 
that both stare decisis and respect for the plenary powers of Congress 
required it to uphold Kiowa.87  It reasoned that Congress has had numerous 
opportunities since Kiowa to abrogate tribal immunity in the manner that 
Michigan sought, but refused to disturb the Court’s holding in that case.88 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The Court began its opinion with a recitation of settled law concerning 
tribal sovereign immunity.  It stated that “[a]mong the core aspects of 
sovereignty that tribes possess . . . is the ‘common-law immunity from suit 
 
83.  Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Chief Justice 
Roberts.  Justice Kagan showed a flair for analogies in her opinion, with a number of droll 
references to the underlying subject matter of the dispute, at one point stating that one of 
Michigan’s arguments had “come up snake eyes . . . .”  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 
S.Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014).  On another occasion, Justice Kagan mused that Michigan “need[s] an 
ace up its sleeve . . . .”  Id.  at 2036. 
84.  Id.  at 2039 (“The abrogation of immunity in IGRA applies to gaming on, but not off, 
Indian lands . . . .  Accordingly, Michigan may not sue Bay Mills to enjoin the Vanderbilt casino, 
but must instead use available alternative means to accomplish that object.”). 
85.  Id.  at 2032 (“A State’s suit to enjoin gaming activity on Indian lands . . . falls within § 
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii); a similar suit to stop gaming activity off Indian lands does not.  And that creates 
a fundamental problem for Michigan.  After all, the very premise of this suit—the reason 
Michigan thinks Bay Mills is acting unlawfully—is that the Vanderbilt casino is outside Indian 
lands.”) (emphasis in original). 
86.  Id.  at 2035 (“[T]he panoply of tools Michigan can use to enforce its law on its own 
lands—no less than the suit it could bring on Indian lands under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)—can shutter, 
quickly and permanently, an illegal casino.”). 
87.  Id.  at 2027-28 (“Congress has since reflected on Kiowa and decided to retain tribal 
immunity in a case like this.  Having held that the issue is up to Congress, the Court cannot 
reverse itself now simply because some may think Congress’s conclusion wrong.”). 
88.  Id.  at 2038 (“Since [Kiowa], Congress has continued to exercise its plenary authority 
over tribal immunity, specifically preserving immunity in some contexts and abrogating it in 
others, but never adopting the change Michigan wants.”). 
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traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’”89  This principle, the Court 
stated, is modified “only by placing a tribe’s immunity, like its other 
governmental power and attributes, in Congress’s hands.”90  Thus, “we 
have time and again treated the ‘doctrine of tribal immunity [as] settled law’ 
and dismissed any suit against a tribe absent congressional authorization (or 
a waiver).”91 
1. Interpreting the Text of IGRA 
With this baseline established, the Court then interpreted the text of 25 
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which authorized states to sue tribes for illegal 
gambling activity taking place “on Indian lands.”92  Because the basis of 
Michigan’s complaint was that the Vanderbilt Casino was operating off of 
Indian lands, the Court saw no need to interpret the meaning of “on Indian 
lands.”93  However, Michigan “attempt[ed] to fit [its] suit within § 
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) by relocating the ‘class III gaming activity’ to which it is 
objecting.”94  Michigan interpreted “class III gaming activity” to mean the 
“necessary administrative action” of authorizing and licensing the 
Vanderbilt Casino, which was done by the Gaming Commission from 
within Bay Mills’ reservation.95  However, the Court disagreed with this 
interpretation, holding that “class III gaming activity” could only be “what 
goes on in a casino—each roll of the dice and spin of the wheel.”96  
Therefore, the Court’s textual interpretation of IGRA foreclosed Michigan’s 
ability to sustain its federal suit against Bay Mills. 
Michigan next argued that it did not make sense for IGRA to provide a 
remedy for illegal gambling that occurs inside Indian country, yet provide 
none for illegal gambling that occurs outside of Indian country.97  The 
 
89.  Id.  at 2030 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).  
90.  Id. 
91.  Id.  at 2030-31 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 
(1998)) (brackets and parenthetical contained in original). 
92.  See 25 U.S.C. §2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2014). 
93.  Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2032. 
94.  Id.  
95.  Id.  
96.  Id.  The Court also stated that the IGRA would “lose all meaning if . . . ‘class III gaming 
activity’ refer[red] equally to the off-site licensing or operation of the games.”  Id. 
97.  Id.  at 2033 (“‘[W]hy,’ Michigan queries, ‘would Congress authorize a state to obtain a 
federal injunction against illegal tribal gaming on Indian lands, but not on lands subject to the 
state’s own sovereign jurisdiction?’  Reply Brief 1.”) (citation contained in original). 
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Court acknowledged this apparent contradiction,98 but stated that it was not 
the job of the courts to rewrite Congress’s legislation.99  At this point, the 
Court made clear that Michigan “has many other powers over tribal gaming 
that it does not possess (absent consent) in Indian territory,” including its 
criminal law, the ability to sue individual tribal officials, and discretion to 
deny licenses.100  More importantly, the Court advised, “if a State really 
wants to sue a tribe for gaming outside Indian lands, the State need only 
bargain for a waiver of immunity.”101  “States have more than enough 
leverage to obtain such terms because a tribe cannot conduct class III 
gaming on its lands without a compact . . . and cannot sue to enforce a 
State’s duty to negotiate a compact in good faith . . . .”102 
2. The Validity of Kiowa 
The Court next addressed Michigan’s argument against the validity of 
Kiowa.  Michigan argued that Kiowa overextended tribal sovereign 
immunity because when tribes engage in gaming activities beyond their 
borders they “operate in [such] capacity less as governments than as private 
businesses.”103  However, the Court did not reach the merits of this 
argument because it refused to overrule Kiowa for two reasons.  First, 
nowhere in Michigan’s case as a whole did the Court find any “special 
justification” that could overcome its preferred course of honoring stare 
decises.104  Michigan only brought forth “retreads of assertions we have 
rejected before [in Kiowa].”105  Second, the Court interpreted Congress’s 
silence in the aftermath of Kiowa as being a virtual affirmation of its 
holding in that case.106  It reasoned that “rather than confronting, as we did 
in Kiowa, a legislative vacuum as to the precise issue presented, we act 
today against the backdrop of a congressional choice:  to retain tribal 
immunity (at least for now) in a case like this one.”107  All of this reasoning 
 
98.  Id.  (“Truth be told, such anomalies often arise from statutes, if for no other reason than 
that Congress typically legislates by parts—addressing one thing without examining all others that 
might merit comparable treatment.”). 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id.  at 2034-35. 
101.  Id.  at 2035. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id.  at 2036. 
104.  Id. (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
105.  Id.  at 2037. 
106.  Id. at 2038 (“Congress has now reflected on Kiowa and made an initial (though of 
course not irrevocable) decision to retain that form of tribal immunity.”) (explanatory 
parenthetical appearing in original). 
107.  Id.  at 2038-39 (explanatory parenthetical appearing in original). 
         
204 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:191 
 
rested on the Court’s assertion that “it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not 
ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity.  The special 
brand of sovereignty the tribes retain—both its nature and its extent—rests 
in the hands of Congress.”108  Thus, finding no grounds to overrule Kiowa, 
the Court affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit.109 
B. JUSTICE THOMAS’S DISSENT 
Justices Scalia,110 Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, and Ginsburg111 
wrote separately, dissenting from the majority’s opinion.  Justice Thomas, 
who authored the principle dissent, took a notably different view on tribal 
sovereignty than the majority.  The dissent states that “[d]espite the Indian 
tribes’ subjection to the authority and protection of the United States 
Government, this Court has deemed them ‘domestic dependent nations’ that 
retain limited attributes of their historic sovereignty.”112  However, “this 
notion cannot support a tribe’s claim of immunity in the courts of another 
sovereign—either a State (as in Kiowa) or the United States (as here).”113  
In the dissent’s view, the immunity of a Tribe from suit, as an incident of 
their sovereignty, does not arise as a matter of right, but rather as a matter 
of comity.114  “In short, to the extent an Indian tribe may claim immunity in 
federal or state court, it is because federal or state law provides it, not 
 
108.  Id.  at 2037. 
109.  Id.  at 2039. 
110.  Justice Scalia adopted the reasoning of Justice Thomas’ dissent and wrote only to 
address his seemingly contradictory role in deciding Kiowa eighteen years earlier.  Id.  at 2045 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia wrote: 
In Kiowa . . . this Court expanded the judge-invented doctrine of tribal immunity to 
cover off-reservation commercial activities . . . I concurred in that decision.  For the 
reasons given today in Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion, which I join, I am now 
convinced that Kiowa was wrongly decided; that, in the intervening 16 years, its error 
has grown more glaringly obvious; and that stare decisis does not recommend its 
retention.  Rather than insist that Congress clean up a mess that I helped make, I 
would overrule Kiowa and reverse the judgment below. 
Id. 
111.  Justice Ginsburg also adopted the reasoning of Justice Thomas, but wrote separately to 
comment generally about the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Drawing on Kiowa as well as 
Seminole Tribe of Florida, she stated: “[f]or the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion . . . by 
Justice Thomas, this Court’s declaration of [a tribal] immunity thus absolute was and remains 
exorbitant.  But I also believe that the Court has carried beyond the pale the immunity possessed 
by States of the United States.”  Id.  at 2055 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
112.  Id.  at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. (application of foreign sovereign immunity “is a matter, not of legal right, but of 
‘grace and comity.’”) (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 711 (2004) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
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merely because the tribe is sovereign.”115  The majority’s ruling in Bay 
Mills “permitting immunity for a tribe’s off-reservation acts represents a 
substantial affront to a different set of sovereigns—the States, whose 
sovereignty is guaranteed by the Constitution.”116  As such, “granting tribes 
immunity with respect to their commercial conduct in state territory [does 
not] serve the practical aim of comity:  allaying friction between 
sovereigns.”117 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s contention that 
Congressional silence in the aftermath of Kiowa indicated approval of the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.  “As a practical matter, it is 
‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure 
to act represents affirmative congressional approval of’ one of this Court’s 
decisions.”118  In addition, despite the majority not addressing such a 
contention, the dissent nonetheless stated that tribal “immunity for off-
reservation commercial acts [is not] necessary to protect tribal self-
governance.”119  To support this proposition, the dissent cited a volume of 
statistics about the proliferation of tribal gaming revenues.120  To conclude, 
the dissent stated that the Kiowa decision was “mistaken then, and the 
Court’s decision to reaffirm it in the face of the unfairness and conflict it 
has engendered is doubly so.”121 
C. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the opinion of the majority, but 
wrote separately to address certain disagreements she had with the principle 
dissent of Justice Thomas.122  Specifically, she disagreed with Justice 
Thomas’s proposition that tribal sovereign immunity ought to be limited to 
the immunity afforded to foreign nations.123  Moreover, Justice Sotomayor 
 
115.  Id.  at 2047. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id.  at 2048. 
118.  Id.  at 2052 (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616. 672 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
119.  Id.  at 2048.  
120.  Id.  at 2050 (“Combined tribal gaming revenues in 28 States have more than tripled—
from $8.5 billion in 1998 to $27.9 billion in 2012.”) (internal citation omitted). 
121.  Id.  at 2055. 
122.  Id.  at 2040 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
123.  Id.  at 2042 (“As the principal dissent observes, “comity is about one sovereign 
respecting the dignity of another.”  Post, at 2047.  This Court would hardly foster respect for the 
dignity of Tribes by allowing States to sue Tribes for commercial activity on State lands, while 
prohibiting Tribes from suing States for commercial activity on Indian lands.  Both States and 
Tribes are domestic governments who come to this Court with sovereignty that they have not 
entirely ceded to the Federal Government.”) (quotations and citations contained in original). 
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took issue with the dissent’s characterization of the economic situation in 
Indian country since the proliferation of Indian gaming.  She cited another 
volume of statistics illustrating the poverty that is still rampant in Indian 
country124 before concluding that “even reservations that have gaming 
continue to experience significant poverty, especially relative to the national 
average . . . .  The same is true of Indian reservations more generally.”125 
IV. IMPACT 
In February of 2014, the Turtle Mountain Tribe of North Dakota 
proposed to open a Class III casino in the city of Grand Forks.126  It had 
previously attempted to negotiate with the Grand Forks City Council twice 
to open such a casino in 2004 and 2009, to no avail.127  While it appeared 
that an initial agreement to negotiate had been reached, little progress had 
been made by June.128  Following this impasse, the Turtle Mountain Tribe 
began developing an alternative plan to open a casino in Trenton, deep in 
the Bakken oil play.129  This scenario reflects a growing, nation-wide trend 
of tribes seeking to open casinos beyond the borders of Indian country.  In 
California, for example, the efforts of the North Fork Rancheria of Mono 
Indians to open an off-reservation casino has led to Proposition 48, a  
state-wide referendum on the subject of Indian gaming.130  Thus, the Bay 
Mills decision has arrived at a crucial period in the development of Indian 
gaming. 
A. THE AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES FOR STATES 
Both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit131 stated in their 
respective opinions that even after foreclosing the possibility of federal 
lawsuits as an injunctive remedy, there are still several remedies available 
 
124.  See id.  at 2042-45. 
125.  Id. at 2045. 
126.  Charly Haley, Turtle Mountain officials will present casino proposal in GF and on 
their reservation, PRAIRIE BUSINESS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.prairiebizmag.com/ 
event/article/id/17884/#sthash.RYmUC2eh.dpuf. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Charly Haley, GF casino plans on hold; tribe pursuing casino in ND oil patch, PRAIRIE 
BUSINESS (June 4, 2014), http://www.prairiebizmag.com/event/article/id/ 
19402/#sthash.2SjkXFhF.dpuf. 
129.  Id. 
130.  David Olson, PROP. 48:  Casino measure could have wide-ranging effects, THE PRESS 
ENTERPRISE (Oct. 12, 2014,), http://www.pe.com/articles/casino-751848-tribes-tribe html.  
131.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 416 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Our decision 
today is not to the exclusion of other remedies that might (or might not) be available to the 
plaintiffs.”). 
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to States for preventing illegal gambling inside and outside of Indian 
country.  In addition to any applicable State criminal law, several federal 
criminal statutes that have not been preempted by IGRA can be utilized for 
such purposes.  For example, 18 U.S.C. section 1955 is the federal statute 
that prohibits illegal gambling operations, wherever they occur.132 
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. section 1166 applies state gambling laws in Indian 
lands in the absence of any preemptory federal law (including IGRA), but 
vests prosecutorial jurisdiction in the federal government.133  In United 
States v. E.C. Investments, Inc.,134 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that either sections 1166 or 1955 could be used to prosecute illegal Class III 
gambling on an Indian reservation.135 
As part of the compacting process, States can negotiate with Tribes not 
only for waivers of immunity, but also to shift jurisdiction for any civil 
disputes that arise on Indian lands to state courts.136  In Doe v. Santa Clara 
Pueblo,137 the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that “[n]othing in the 
language of IGRA prohibits jurisdiction shifting” so as to give effect to a 
Tribal-State compact that vested jurisdiction over personal injury claims 
arising at a Class III gaming facility in state court.138  Furthermore, if tribes 
do wish to open Class III facilities off-reservation like Bay Mills sought to, 
the tribe must meet additional burdens.139  For example, the state governor 
has veto power over any determination of the NGIC that a Class III facility 
can be opened off-reservation.140  In Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
 
132.  18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2014) (“Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, 
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
133.  18 U.S.C. § 1166(a), (d) (2014) (“[F]or purposes of Federal law, all State laws 
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to 
criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the 
same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State . . .  The United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made 
applicable under this section to Indian country . . . .”). 
134.  77 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1996).  
135.  Id. at 331 (“There is no indication that Congress intended to bar the federal government 
from prosecuting violations of section 1955 on Indian territory.  In fact, by opening with “for 
purposes of Federal law,” section 1166’s jurisdictional grant is not merely limited to section 1166, 
but rather applies equally to other federal statutes which could certainly include section 1955.”). 
136.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii) (2014) (“Any Tribal-State compact . . . may include 
provisions relating to . . . the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the 
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations . . . .”). 
137.  154 P.3d 644 (N.M. 2007). 
138.  Id. at 648. 
139.  See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (2014). 
140.  25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2014) “([T]he Secretary [of the Interior] . . . determines 
that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian 
tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the 
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Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United States,141 a federal court 
held that the gubernatorial veto power was constitutional,142 thus placing 
more regulatory power in the hands of the states.  In summary, state 
remedies for preventing illegal tribal gaming are readily available, even 
after Bay Mills. 
B. THE FUTURE OF INDIAN GAMING 
The immediate effect of the Bay Mills decision was to cut off litigation 
similar to that at issue in the case. Michigan had previously petitioned for 
certiorari to review another Sixth Circuit opinion, Michigan v. Sault St. 
Marie Band of Chippewa Indians.143  That case involved almost identical 
circumstances to those present in Bay Mills, with another tribe in Michigan 
seeking to open a Class III gaming facility off its reservation.144  As a result 
of Bay Mills, Michigan quite logically withdrew its petition on June 3, 
2014.145  However, it remains to be seen what sort of long-term effect Bay 
Mills will gave on Indian gaming. 
An amici curiae brief filed on behalf of several Indian tribes as part of 
the Bay Mills proceedings listed a number of existing Class III gaming 
compacts that include waivers of tribal immunity.146  Ironically, one of the 
included compacts was between the Seminole Tribe and the State of 
Florida.147  After two decades of lawsuits between the two, they compacted 
under IGRA and gave mutual waivers of immunity.148  This would appear 
to be the simplest solution to assuage any fears about loss of remedy in any 
Tribal-State gaming compact negotiation, and Bay Mills does nothing to 
change this.  In fact, the decision underscores the importance of mutuality 
during the compacting process.  However, some states may nonetheless 
interpret Bay Mills as a loss of remedy, and such states will probably 
 
Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s 
determination.). 
141.  259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003) aff’d, 367 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004). 
142.  Id. at 799 (“The gubernatorial concurrence does not offend the Tenth Amendment or 
principles of federalism.”). 
143.  737 F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2013).   
144.  Id. at 1076. 
145.  See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan Withdraws Cert Petition in Michigan 
v. Sault Tribe, TURTLE TALK (Sept. 20, 2014), https://turtletalk files.wordpress.com/2014/06/ 
ltr-clerk-withdraw-13-1372.pdf. 
146.  Brief of Amici Curiae Seminole Tribe of Florida, et al. 12-23, Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014) (Docket No. 12-515).  
147.  Id. at 13-15. 
148.  Id. 
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become wary to negotiate with tribes.  Thus, despite it being a positive 
decision for tribal sovereignty, Bay Mills may yet entail negative results for 
those tribes seeking to engage in Class III gaming.  Only time will tell. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legacy of the Bay Mills decision will rest in its clarification and 
refinement of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.  That said, the 
decision will likely do little to change the status quo in the world of Indian 
gaming.  In fact, it may result in states seeking greater leverage from Tribes 
when negotiating gaming compacts.  As the Court makes clear in Bay Mills, 
nothing in IGRA prohibits a state from seeking a waiver of immunity from 
a tribe or from utilizing any other state or federal remedies for preventing 
illegal gambling.  The desirable result of Bay Mills would be a greater 
degree of communication between tribes and states during the compacting 
process about dispute resolution.  However, after Seminole Tribe, states still 
retain the lion’s share of bargaining power in compact negotiations.  While 
tribes may be willing to waive sovereign immunity from suit, states may not 
be willing to reciprocate.  Bay Mills’ legacy will thus ultimately depend on 
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